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guilty plea and pleaded guilty to one count. under the provision be initiated by a prisonThe allegations of the prior convictions er but rather by the court or the Director
wefe struck on motiol'l of the People, and of Corrections. (Alanis v. Superior Court,
the second count was dismissed. Thomas Cal., 83 Cal.Rptr. 355, 463 P.2d 707.)
was committed to the California RehabiliThe alternative writ of mandamus is distation Center under the narcotics rehabili- charged, and the petition for a peremptory
tation program (Welf. & Inst.Code, § writ is denied.
3051) but was excluded from that program.
In April 1967 probation was denied, and he . TRAYNOR, C. J., and McCOMB, PEwas sentenced to prison for the tenn pre- TERS, TO BRINER, MOSK and SULLIscribed by law.
VAN, JJ., concur.
In May 1969 Thomas filed with respondent the petition seeking relief under section 1168. The petition alleged "on infor- .
matian and belief" that "the current diagnostic ~tudy -*
*_ recommends his release under qualified parole or probation
supervision" and that "because of the Na-

•

o : m 1""1E1 "STIM
T

*

ture of things and his status as an inmate
of the * * * Department of Corrections, [he] is unable to obtain a copy of
this current diagnostic study * * * and
recommendation.1!
He requested "the
Court to investigate the matters presented
in this Petition * * *, to call for the
Department of Corrections to present a
current diagnostic study * * * and
recommendation, and to recall the ,commitment * * * and re-sentence Defendant
to probation * * *." Respondent sum-

83 Cal.Rptr. 359

Angeline TAORMINO, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
Y.

Neal J. DENNY, Defendant and Respondent.

Sac. 7849.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan. 27, 1970.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1970.

Action was brought for injunction to
quiet title to road over which defendant

marily denied the petition on May 28, 1969.

claimed easement by prescription.' The Su-

An attempt to file .a notice of appeal from
. the denial was rejected by the clerk of respondent court.

perior Court, Yuba County, Richard A.
Schoenig, J., rendered judgment adverse
to plaintiff, and plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court, Traynor, C. J., held that
evidence sustained finding that defendant
acquired easement or right-of-way in road
by prescription.
Affirmed.
McComb, J.f dissented.

[Is 2] Under the prOVISIOn relied upon
in Penal Code, section 1168 the court is authorized to recall a prison sentence and
commitment and to resentence the defendant if such action is deemed warranted by
the diagnostic study and recommendations
approved by the Director of Corrections.
The provision was not intended to authorize the granting of probation as an alternative to release on pa.ro1e but rather to empower the court to take such action where
it appears from the specified matters that
the prison sentence should never had been
imposed. (Holder v. Superior. Court, Ca1.,
83 Cal.Rptr. 353, 463 P.2d 705.) The
Legislature did not intend that a proceeding

I. New Trial <8=>163(1)

Order directing that prQceedings be reopened in cause tried without jury was
ruling on motion for new trial within
meaning of both statute dealing with hearing on motion for new trial and statute
dealing with powers of judge on motion
for new ~rial in cause tried by court.
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §§ 660, 662.
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2. New Trial €=>163(2)

Failure of trial court, in cause tried
without jury, to include language directing
vacation of prior findings and judgment
in ruling on motion for new trial could not
lessen effect of ruling. West's Ann.Code
Civ.Proe. §§ 660, 662.
3. Judgment €=>397
Trial €=>66

In view of statutory provision that
when case is reopened in lieu of granting
a new trial, effect is same as if case had
been reopened before findings had been
filed or judgment entered, order made pursuant thereto directing that case be reopened has effect of vacating findings and
judgment. West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §

662.
4. New Trial €=>159

Where matter, which was tried without jury, was returned to posture in which
it was prior to date of judgment under
statutory provision that when case is reopened in lieu of granting new trial, effect is same as if case had been reopened
before findings had been filed or judgment
entered, motion for new trial was disposed
of, and provisions of statute dealing with
new trial no longer applied. West's Ann.
Code Civ.Proc. §§ 660, 662.
5. Trial €=>72

Though court trying cause without jury
lost jurisdiction to act on motion for new
trial 60 days after motion was filed, its
jurisdiction to enter judgment in reopened
proceedings was in no way affected.
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §§ 660, 662.
6. Trial €=>404(5)

Fact that judgment was not in conformity with memorandum opinion did not
affect validity of judgment, since "memorandum opinion" is not a decision, and
though it may purport to decide issues in
case, it is merely an informal statement of
views of trial judge, and it does not constitute findings of fact.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

7. Easements ~5
Elements necessary to establish prescriptive easemen~ are, with exception of
requirement that taxes be paid, identical
with those required to prove acquisition
of title by adverse possession: open and
notorious use or possession, that is continuous and uninterrupted, hostile to true
owner, and under claim of right, and such
use for five-year statutory period confers
title by prescription. West's Ann.Code
Civ.Proe. § 321; West's Ann.Civ.Code, §
1007.
8. Easements ~5
Taxes need not be paid by claimant
of easement by prescription in apsence of
showing by record owner that taxes were
separately levied on easement. West's
• Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 321; West's Ann.
Civ.Code, § 1007.
9. Easements €=>36(3)

Evidence sustained finding that defendant had easement in road. West's
Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 321; West's Ann.Civ.
Code, § 1007.
10. Easements €=>61(12)

Judgment holding that defendant had
easement in road was not ambiguous or
conditional because judgment failed to
specify whether defendant's right to use
road was conditioned on his payment of
his share of maintenance expense and, if so,
what that share was and to whom it should
be paid. West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 845.

Steel & Arostegui and Robert W. Steel,
Marysville, for plaintiff and appellant.
Hewitt, McBride, Kenward & Lane and
James R. McBride, Yuba City, for defendant and respondent.
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.
Plaintiff brought this proceeding for an
injunction and to quiet her title to a road
over which defendant claimed both an
easement .by prescription and a right to
pass by virtue of an implied dedication to
the public. On September 19, 1966, the
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court entered judgment for plaintiff quieting her title to the road and enjoining any
occupancy or trespass by defendant.
The court found that the road had existed
on plaintiff's property since 1910 or be~
fore, that defendant had frequently used
the road without plaintiff's consent and
claimed an interest in the road adverse to
plaintiff's title. The court also found
that defendant acquired his property adjoining plaintiff's in 1964 and that his
immediate predecessor in title had never
claimed a right of way over the road, but
had asked for and received permission to
use the road whenever he made use of it.
None of defendant's predecessors in title
had made use of the road under a claim
of right or adversely to plaintiff's title suf·
ficient to establish any legal claim, and
there had never been a formal or implied
dedication of the road to public use.
A hearing on defendant's motion for new
trial was held on November 10, 1966.
Thereafter, the court filed a "Ruling on
Motion for New Trial" ,ordering that the
matter be reopened for' testimony of defendant's predecessor in title only but not
of any other witnesses already heard. A
hearing was held on February 27, 1967.
On March 14, 1967, the court filed a memorandum opinion adopting the previous judgment in its entirety. On April 3, 1967, defendant filed a second notice of intention
to move for a new trial. On August 4,
1967, however, the court filed another memorandum opinion modifying the "original
Opinion" and holding that defendant had a
right to use the road for purposes related
to farming operations on his land and that
defendant must share in the maintenance
and upkeep of the road. New findings of
fact and conclusions of law were filed, and
on October 10, 1967, judgment was entered
in conformity with the modified opinion.
Plaintiff appeals from that part of the October 10, 1967 judgment awarding defendant an easement in the road.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to modify the judgment
of September 19, 1966 and that, if it had
463 P.2d-45Va

jurisdiction, there is no evidence to support the court's finding that the use of the
road by defendant and his predecessor in
title was adverse to her title. She also
contends that the judgment is ambiguous
in failing to specify whether the easement
was conditioned on payment by defendant
of a part of the maintenance expense, and,
if so, what that share is, to whom it is to
be paid, and, in what state of repair the
road is to be maintained. We have concluded that none of the foregoing contentions has merit and that the judgment
should be affirmed.

Jurisdiction to Enter the Judgment of
October 10, 1967
The suggestion that the court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the judgment of October 10, 1%7 is based on Code of Civil
Proc~dure section 660 governing motions
for a new trial. At the time this action
was commenced the relevant part of that
section read: "Except as otherwise provided in Section 12a of this code, the
power of the court to pass on motion for
a new trial shaH expire 60 days from and
after service on the moving party of written notice of the entry of the judgment,
or if such notice has not theretofore been
served, then 60 days after filing of the
notice of intention to move for a new trial.
If such motion is not determined within
said period of 60 days, or within said period
as thus extended, the effect shall be a
denial of the motion without further order
of the court. A motion for a new trial
is not determined within the meaning of
this section until an order ruling on the
motion (1) is entered in the pennanent
minutes of the court or (2) is signed by
the judge and filed with the clerk."
[1] Plaintiff contends that the trial
court never ruled on defendant's motion
for a new trial and therefore lacked jurisdiction to make further ord'ers granting
relief under section 660 subsequent to the
denial of the motion by operation of law
60 days from September 19, 1966, the date
upon which notice of entry of judgment
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was mailed. This argument denies any effect to the order of November 10, 1966,
made within the 60-day period and titled
by the court "Ruling on Motion for New
Tria1." That order directing that the proceedings be reopened was a "ruling on the
motion" within the meaning of both section 660 and section 662 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Section 662 governs the
powers of a court ruling on a motion for
new trial and provides specifically: "In
ruling on such motion, in a cause tried
without a jury, the court may, on such
terms as may be just, change or add to the
findings, modify the j-udgment, in whole
or in part, vacate the judgment, in whole
or in part, and grant a new trial on all or
part of the issues, or, in lieu of granting a
new trial, may vacate and Set aside the
findings and judgment and reopen the CaSe
for further proceedings and the introduction of additional evidence with the same
effect as if the case had been reopened after
the submission thereof and before findings
had been filed or judgment rendered."
(Italics added.)
[2-4] Plaintiff concedes that the court
did reopen the proceedings, but contends
that it did not vacate the findings and
judgment pursuant to section 662. The
failure of the trial court to include language
directing vacation of its prior findings and
judgment in the ruling on the motion for
new trial cannot lessen the effect of that
ruling. The court ordered that the matter
be reopened. Section 662 provides that
when a case is reopened in lieu of granting
a new trial, the effect is the same as if
the case had been reopened before the
findings had been filed or judgment entered. It follo~s that an order made pursuant
to section 662 directing that a case be reopened has the effect of vacating the findI. Plaintiff's claim that the court denied

the motion for new trial on March 14,
1967 is not supported by the record. The
memornndum opinion of that dnte read:
"On Order of the Court, the above entitled matter was set for further hearing
to determine if any further evidence would
alter the Opinion heretofore rendered in
favor of the plaintiff.

ings and judgment. Inasmuch as the matter was returned to the posture in which
it was prior to entry of judgment, the motion for new trial had been disposed of and
the provisions of section 660 no longer applied. 1

[5,6] Defendant filed his second notice of intention to move for a new trial on
April 3, 1967, prior to entry of judgment.
The motion was denied by operation of
law on June 2, 1967, when the court failed
to act on the motion. Although the court
lost jurisdiction to act on that motion 60
days after the motion was filed, its jurisdiction to enter judgment in the reopened
proceedings was in no way affected. The
fact that the judgment was not in conformity with the memorandum opinion of
March 14, 1967 does not affect the validity
of the judgment. A memorandum opinion
is not a decision. Although it may purport
to decide issues in the case, it is merely
an informal statement of the views of the
trial judge. It does not constitute findings
of fact. (People v. Hills (1947) 30 Cal.2d
694, 702, 185 P 2d 11; De Cou v. Howell
(1923) 190 Cal. 741, 751, 214 P.2d 444.
See, 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, p. 1873.)
"'No antecedent expression of the judge,
whether casual or cast in the form of an
opinion, can in any way restrict his absolute
power to declare his final conclusion * *
by filing the "decision" (findings of fact
and conclusions of law) provided for by
* * * the Code of Civil Procedure.'
(Scholle v. Finnell, 173 Cal. 372, 376, 159
P. 1179.)" (Strudthoff v. Yates (1946) 28
Cal.2d 602, 616, 170 P.2d 873, 881.)

Sufficiency of the Evidence of An Easement by Prescription
The findings of fact and conclusions of
law accompanying the judgment of October
"The Court is satisfied that further evidence indicates that the previous ruling
of the Court in this matter should not be
disturbed.
"Counsel for plaintiff shall prepare the
necessary documents."

TAORMINO v. DENNY

Cal.

715

Cite as 463 P .2d 711

10, 1%7 recited that the plaintiff was the
owner in fee simple of the road in issue,
that defendant was the owner in fee siPlple
of real property adjoining the road, and
that: "It is true that defendant, without
plaintiff's consent or permission frequently enters upon .said roadway and uses the
same for the purposes of conducting his
farming operations, that is to say, for the
purposes of cultivation and harvesting the
crops produced on said real property * *
[D]efendant's predecessor in title * * *
M. Thome * * * used said road for the
purpose of cultivating his said property and
harvesting the crops thereon for more than
ten years prior to the commencement of
this action, which said use had been conducted openly, notoriously, continuously and
adverse to plaintiff's alleged rights in said
roadway, and without asking or receiving
permission from anyone, that is to say,
either the plaintiff herein, or plaintiff's
predecessors in interest."
The following evidence relative to the
use of the road by defendant and his
predecessor in title, Matt Thome, was adduced at the trial. Plaintiff is the owner
of farm property on the Oroville Highway
in Yuba County. She purchased the property in 1943. She and her late husband had
first leased the property in 1937. Defendant purchased the farm propert,y immediately south of that owned by plaintiff in 1964
from Matt Thome who had owned it since
1946. At the time Thome acquired his
property a road existed on plaintiff's property_ The road ran in a westerly direction
from the highway along the southern
boundary of plaintiff's property. The road
had at one time been fenced on each side,
but the fence along the north side was no
longer there when plaintiff purchased her
2. The letter reads: "Dear Mrs. Taormino:
"You have told -me that you are plan·
ning possible improvements to the road
which runs westerly from the Oroville
Highway along the southerly border of
your ranch, and immediately to the north
of my property. You have also told me
that. in connection with a cost sharing
scheme that is being worked out for the
road, your attorney has said that it would

property. The fence along the south side
was removed sometime after Matt Thome
purchased the land later cqnveyed to defendant.
The road was used by both strangers and
local residents to reach farms to the west
of plaintiffs property and by occasional
hunters and fishermen to gain access to the
bottomlands of the Feather River. At
times the road had been posted at the Oroville Highway entrance. ' Plaintiff and her
son-in-law, Roger Hoon, stopped strangers
using the road to ascertain whether they
had legitimate· business, but did not stop
neighbors.
Plaintiff and Hoon testified that they
had posted "No Trespassing" signs twice,
that Thome had requested permission to use
the road at harvest time and on numerous
other occasions, and that permission had
been granted. In June 1965, Hoon presented a letter drafted by plaintiff's attorney to
Thome for signature. The letter, signed
by Thome, acknowledged that Thome had
no claim to a right of way over the road,
had never made such a claim and had not
represented to defendant that defendant
would have such a claim.! Thome testified
that he had no permission to use the road
and had never spoken to plaintiff about the
use of the road.

He used the road fre-

quently for at least 10 years without asking
permission of anyone, knowing it was on
plaintiff's property. The road was closed
only when repairs were being made. He
had signed. the letter believing its purport
to be that he had not given defendant any
right to the road. He had never seen sign'sposted by others limiting the use of the
road, although he had posted one himself
at one time.
be helpful to you if I acknowledged that
I do not have and that I have never
made a claim to a right of way over
that road. This I am happy to do.
"When I sold a portion of my property
to Mr. Denney about a year ago, I af·
forded Mr. Denney other aecess to the
property I sold him, and I at no time
represented to him that he would have
any right of way over your road."

.'U6
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Defendant testified that he and other
users of the road paid to have

it oiled and

sanded in 1964. He refused to make an
additional contribution later in that year
when requested to do so by plaintiff and, in
response to her threat to put a chain aCross
the road, asserted his claim to a right of
way.
Other defense witnesses offered cumulative testimony that they had often used the
road without permission and had not seen
"No Trespassing" signs.

evidence, however, leads us to conclude
that substantial evidence supports the
judgme'tlt of the trial court as to each- element. Direct evidence established both the
requisite open, continuous use and the
nature of the use for purposes related to
cultivation and harvesting crops on defendant's property. Whether the use was under
a claim of right adverse to the owner is a
question of fact. (O'Banion v. Borba,

supra, 32 Cal.2d 145, 149, 195 P.2d 10.)

If substantial evidence supports

The trial court was not compelled to accept either plaintiff's evidence or Thome's
conclusion as expressed in his letter as to

the judgment that defendant acquired an
easement or right of way in the roadway by

the nature of the use. (Blank v. Coffin
(1942) 20 Cal.2d 457, 461, 126 P.2d 868.)

[7,8]

prescription; the judgment must be affirmed.

All conflicts must be resolved in favor

of the prevailing party and the evidence

viewed in the light most favorable to him.
(O'Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145,
147-148, 195 P 2d 10.) The elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement
are. with the exception of the requirement
that taxes be paid.3 identical with those
required to prove acquisition of title by
adverse possession: open and notorious
use or possess-ion that is continuous - and
uninterrupted, hostile to the true owner.
and under ,a, claim of -right. (Thomas v.

England· (1886) 71 Cal. 456, 459-460, 12
P. 491.) Such use for the five-year statutory period of Code of Civil Procedure
section 321 ' confers a title by prescription.

(Civ.Code,§ 1007.)"
[9]

Thome's testimony and letter were susceptible of conflicting inferences-that the
use was permissive and a matter of neigh-

borly accommodation, or tha!' his use of the
road over a IO-year period without asking
penmSSlOn adequately demonstrated a

claim of right to do so. The trial court is
the arbiter of the facts, and this court
cannot upset its decision as a matter of
law when substantial evidence supports

the judgment.

Ambiguity of the Judgment
[10]

Plaintiff complains that the judg-

ment fails to specify whether defendant's
right to use the road is conditioned on his
payment of his share of the maintenance
expense and, if so, what that share is and
to whom it should be paid. The rules

Plaintiff contends that none of the

set forth in section 845 of the Civil Code

requisite elements of adverse possession
exist. The foregoing summary of the

govern the maintenance of private rights
of way in the absence of 'an agreement.8

3. Taxes Jieed not be paid by the claimant
of an easement by prescription in the
absence of a showing by the record owner
thnt taxes were separately levied on the
easement. (Glatts v. Henson (1948) 31

Ca1.2d 368, 372, ]88 P.2d 745.)
4. Colle of Civil Procedure section 321:
"In every action for the recovery of real
property, or the possession thereof, the
person estublishing a legal title to the
property is presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by
law, and the occupation of the property
by any other person is deemed to have

been under nnd in subordination to the
legal title, unless it appear that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for five years before
the commencement of the action."
5. Civil Code section 1007: "Occupancy
for the period prescribed by the Code of
Civil Procedure as sufficient to bar any
action for the recovery of the property
confers a title thereto, denominated a title
by prescription * .. "."

6. Civil Code section 845: ''The owner of
any easement in the nature of a private
right 'of way, or of any land to which any
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The judgment is in no way conditional.
Section 845 provides a method by which
to apportion costs if no agreement is
reached among the owners of an easement
and a remedy enforceable against a delinquent owner by the other owners of the
easement.
The judgment is affirmed.
PETERS,
TOBRINER,
MOSK,
BURKE and SULLIVAN,]}.; concur.
McCOMB, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent on the jurisdictional issue.
The judgment of October 10, 1967, was
made after the court had lost control of
the cause and was therefore in excess
of jurisdiction and void. The record indicates that the motion for new trial was
timely made and that the trial court did
make a fuling on the matioH within the
statutory time limits. The question presented is whether this ruling was a sufficient exercise of jurisdiction to comply
with the statutory grant of power to modify a judgment without a retrial. In my
opinion it was not.
Code of Civil Procedure sections 655 et
seq. set forth the time and manner in
which the court may act upon motions for
new t~ial. These provisions are j urisdictional and must be strictly observed.

(Siegal 'v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.
2d 97, 100, 65 Cal.Rptr. 311, 436 P.2d 311;
Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, :tnc. '(1961)
55 Ca1.2d 162, 166, 10 Cal.Rptr. 462, 358
P.2d 918.) The trial court has no in-

117

herent power to grant a ,new trial. . (bia~
mond v. Superior Court (1922) 189 'cai.
732, 736, 210 P. 36.) Review of the code
sections and their legislative history indicates a continuing con~ern on the part of
the Legislature that ,a timely and efficacious procedure be ,established to avoid
the expense and delays of an appeal by allowing the trial court to re-examine the
facts (§ 662) or issues of law (Carney v.
Simmonds (1957) 49 Cal.2d 84, 90, 315
P.2d 305) after a trial and decision. It
was originally empowered to do this by
granting a new trial. Subsequently it was
given broad powers to, do this by denying
a new trial. In either case it was required
to act within a limited, period of time.
Originally it was required that a motion
for new trial be made within four judiM
cial days after judgment was' rendered
and that the court "d~cide 'summarily on
such application" (Stats.1851, First SesM
sian, Ch. XX, §§ 252, 257). The time for
filing has been changed from time:' to time
(30 days, Code Civ.Proc., § 659, enacted
1872), 15 days (§ 659, 1967 am.). It was
limited to 10 days (1951 am.) at the times
here involved. There have been legislative
changes made in the"time within which the
court must act. (See" Historical Note,
West's Anno. Code, Code Civ.Proc., § 660~)
In 1915 hearing and dis~osition -of tbe -moM
tion for new trial was given precedence over
all other matters except tTimimll cases, probate matters and cases actually on trial.
In 1929 the time withih which the court
could act' on the .motion was -fixed at 60
!

such easement is attached, shall maintain
it in repair.
"
"If the easement is owned by more than
one person, or is attached to' parcels' of
land under different ownership, the cost
of maintaining it in repair shall be shared
by each owner of the easement or the
owners of the parcels of land. as the case
may be, pursuant to the terms of any
agreement entered into by the par1;ies
for that purpose. In the absence of an
agreement, the cost shall be shared proportionately to the use made of the easement by each owner.
"In the absence of an agreemeJ;lt, any
owner of the easemtmt, or any owner of

I

land to which _the easement is attached,
m~y apply to the 8u~rior court where
the right of way is lckated for the appojntment of an imparl-tial arbitrator to
apportion such cost. If the arbitration
a~ard is not accepted ~y all of' the owners, the court may determine the proportionate liability of" thej ,owners, and its
order shall have the flffect of a judgment.
"If anyone of the owners of the easement or parce]s of land fails, after demand in writing, to pay his proportion of
the. expense, action -may, be ,brought
against him in a court of competent jurisdiction by the other owners, either
jointly or severally, for contribution."

718
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days from and after service on the moving
party of written notice of entry of judgment or, if such notice was not served,
then 60 days after filing the notice of intention to move for new trial. Fallowing
a study by the California Law Revision
Commission that disclosed variance and
confusion as to what acts must be done
by a judge to make an effective ruling
within the 60 days in which he has jurisdiction to act on the motion, section 660
was amended in 1959 to provide that "A
motion for a new trial is not determined
within the meaning of this section until
an order ruling on the motion (1) is entered in the permanent minutes of the court
or (2) is signed by the judge and filed

with the clerk. The entry of a new trial
order in the permanent minutes of the
court shall constitute a determination of the
motion even though such minute order as
entered expressly directs that a written order be prepared, signed and filed. The minute entry shall in all cases show the date on
which the order actually is entered in the
permanent minutes, but failure to comnly
with this direction shall not impair the
validity or effectiveness of this order."
(§ 660; Siegal v. ~uperior Court (1968)
68 Cal.2d 97, 100-101, 65 Cal.Rptr. 311, 436
P.2d 311; McCordic v. Crawford (1943) 23
Cal.2d I, 6, 142 P.2d 7; 34 State Bar J.,
643.) Obviously this language required
that a subsequent order be correlative to
and not different from the determination
of the court as entered in a timely minute
order. There is nothing which indicates
that the court could extend beyond 60
days the time within which it could "pass
upon," "rule upon" or make a determination
of the motion for new trial.

In 1929 an innovation was made by the
Legislature when it enacted section 662,
allowing the trial court to make changes
in the findings or conclusions of law and
to give an entirely different judgment
without granting a new trial. This section
reads: "In ruling on such motion, in a
cause tried without a jury, the court may,
on such terms as may be just, change or
add to the findings, modify the judgment,

in whole or in part, vacate the judgment,
in whole or in part, and grant a new trial
on all or part of the issues, or, in lieu
of granting a new trial, may vacate and
set aside the findings and judgment and
reopen the case for further proceedings
and the introduction 'of additional evidence with the same effect as if the case
had been reopened after the submission
thereof and before findings had been filed
or judgment rendered. Any judgment
thereafter entered shall be subject to the
provisions of section 657 and 659 [motions
for new trial] of this code." The obvious
purpose in giving these broad alternative
powers to the court was to subserve the
ends of justice and to prevent unnecessary
delays in cases where the court deemed
itself mistaken as to its previous view of
the evidence or in the application thereto
of the law, without the necessity of granting a new trial. (Spier v. Lang (1935)
4 Cal.2d 711, 714, 53 P.2d 138; see 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) § 35, p. 2083,
1967 Supp., p. 852.) In Spier we stated
at page 715, 53 P.2d at 140: "The language of section 660 of the Code of Civil
Procedure indicates that so long as the court
'passes' on the motion within the sixty-day
period, it has lawfully exercised its jurisdiction to determine the motion, and the filing
of the formal order or findings and judgment 'thereafter,' when the time of filing is
subsequent to the last day of the sixty-day
period, does not amount to a denial of
the motion by operation of law." There
is no intent indicated in the language of
the statute that different provisions may
be incorporated in the formal order or
findings and judgment entered after the
6O.. day period had elapsed. An order or
judgment (i. e., findings) may be signed
and filed thereafter (De Arman v. Connelly (1933) 134 Cal.App. 173, 180, 25
P.2d 24) but if different than and not
made pursuant to an order entered within the 60-day period they are in excess
of the court's jurisdiction and void. (See
Avery v. Associated Seed Growers (1963)
211 Cal.App.2d 613, 628-ti29, 27 Cal.Rptr.
625.)
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In ruling on the motion for new trial
the court may do anyone or more of the
things permitted by section 662 (Oliver v.
Boxley (1960) 181 CaI.App.2d 471, 477,
5 CaJ.Rptr. 468). It is preferable that the
statutory, language be used in the order
ruling on the motion but some departure
in terminology is permissible if the court's
: intention is clear (Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack
Plumbing Co. (1961) 55 CaJ.2d 573, 578,
12 Ca1.Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897) or if ambiguities therein may be reconciled by construction to determine the substance and
legal effect of the order. (See discussion
of cases in 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954)
§ 37, pp. 2085-2086.) The order should be
in the present tense, and is subject to
criticism and possible invalidity if it is in
the future tense (Pacific. Home Co. v.
County of Los Angeles (1953) 41 Ca1.2d
855, 857, 264 P.2d 539). Whatever number
of ,hearings may be held on the motion, a
determinative order ruling thereon should
be made within the 60-day mandatory period.
The record herein indicates that at the
. trial the court pennitted plaintiff, over
defendant's objections, to introduce in eviletter from Matt Thome, defenddence
ant's predecessor in title, that was highly
prejudicial to defendant's case. Neither
party had called Thome as a witness. No
continuance was requested so that he could
be called. Judgment was rendered on
September 19, 1966. Motion for new
trial urged, among other grounds, errors
in law, occurring at the trial and excepted
to by the moving party. On November 10,
1966, the court ruled on this motion. Its
order recited the grounds of the motion
u * *
* and (3) that errors in law occurring during the trial and more specifically the introduction of a letter by the
witness Thome. * * * This Court does
concede that it was influenced to some.
degree by the evidence introduced from
the witness Thome. The Court further
feels that * * * it may well be that
Mr. Thome's evidence shculd have been
given in person and subject to cross-examination. Therefore, the Court rules as fo1-

a

lows: The matter will be reopened to take
the testimony ofMa\ Thome but the Court
does not desire :to l\ave any of the other
witnesses recalled. If either counsel has
newly discovered evidence, they may so
introduce it at the time of hearing to take
additional evidence. All other matters will
be kept in abeyance pending the submission

of the causes under the procedure hereinabove outlined. * * *.. Hearing was
held in February 1%7 after the 60 days
had expired. In March the court entered
an order stating "The Court is satisfied
that further evidence indicates that the
previous ruling of the Court in this matter
should not be disturb~d. Counsel for plaintiff shall prepare the necessary documents." The next order entered was on
August 4, changing the court's decision,
and pursuant thereto amended findings
and conclusions were filed on October 10,
1967, more than a year after the original
judgment of September 19, 1966.
The order of November 10, 1%6, was
entered within the 6O-day period. It purported to exercise some of the alternative
powers granted by section 662. It did not
purport to grant a new trial. Had the
court granted a new trial, either full or
limited, it would have then" exhausted its
jurisdiction to rule further on the nIotion,
and any further trial proceedings would
not be subject to the time limitations of
these sections. The I'in lieu 'of granting
a new trial" provisions are, as they state,
"in lieu" thereof, and do not constitute
granting a new trial. They empower the
court "to do certain things in denying the
motion. Without taking any new evidence
the court may vacate or add to any of the
findings. It may re-open for further proceedings and additional evidence "with
the same effect as if the case had been reopened after the submission thereof and
before findings had been filed or judgment
rendered." There is no' express extension
of time within which the court may act
after it re-opens. As hereinabove discussed, section 660 requires a definitive, not
an interlocutory or non-determinative
order, to be entered within the 6O-day
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period. Interpreting section 662 to allow
a trial court to enter an order vacating
and reopening pursuant to these Hin lieu"
provisions, with unlimited time thereafter
to continue further hearings and to make
further determinations, is contrary to the
clear intent of these sections. The concluding sentence of section 662 that "Any
judgment thereafter entered shaH be subject to the provisions of sections 657 and
659 of this code" specifically allows apparently unlimited motions for new trial
to be made as to any judgment or definitive
order made within the 60 days, subject of
courSe to the requirement that if the actual
findings are signed and filed after the
60-day period the motion is premature if
taken before such time. (Auto Equity

Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57
Ca1.2d 450, 459, 20 Ca1.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d
937; 3 Witkin, supra, ·2072.)
The "in lieu" provisions empower the
court to vacate and set aside the findings
and reopen the proceedings, with the effect
"as if the case had been reopened after the
submission thereof and before findings
had been filed or judgment rendered." If
the further proceedings are required to
be concluded within the 60-day period,
and no final determination is made within
that· time, it would follow that any intermediate orders made pursuant to a motion
for new trial purporting to set aside any
portion of the findings or conclusions
would be ineffective, and that the court's
jurisdiction to act thereafter would terminate by operation of law. There was
nothing in the record nor in the order of
November 10, 1966, which indicated that
extensive hearings were contemplated or
that the court thought that the indicated
error of law was sufficient to support the
granting of an entirely new trial. It did
not expressly vacate and set aside the
findings. It could be implied that it was
postponing that step until it determined,
after the introduction of further evidence
(i. e., the testimony of Thome), whether
any change should be made in its findings.
In aid of this interpretation, the language
of the March 14, 1967, memo opinion is

enlightening. It reads 'IOn Order of the
Court, the above entitled matter was set
for further hearing to determine if any
further evidence would alter the opinion
heretofore rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The Court is satisfied that further
evidence indicates that the previous ruling
of the Court in this matter should not be
disturbed. * * * " Had this opinion
been entered as a minute order prior to
the expiration of the 6O-day period (see 3
Witkin, supra, p. 1873) it might have
been a sufficient determination to support
the original judgment. If the original
findings are construed to have been ipso
facto vacated by the order of November
10, 1966, it might have supported the resigning and filing of the same findings
at a time subsequent to the 60-day period.
However the jurisdiction of the court to
proceed had expired be fore March 14,
1967, and the court's power to act on the
motion for new trial had expired by
operation of law.
The second motion made by defendant,
dated April 3, 1967, was entitled "Notice
of Intention to Move for New Trial Limited to Purpose of Taking Additional
Testimony and Adding to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure, Section 662."
As a motion for new trial it was premature, and ineffective for any purpose,
having been filed more than 60 days from
the entry of the original judgment and no
judgment was thereafter rendered to which
it could apply. The majority opinion is
in error in stating that the motion was
denied by operation of law on J nne 2,
1967, when the court failed to act on the
motion (Opinion, page 362). The motion
was premature if intended to apply to the
order of the court of March 14, 1967. Conceding arguendo that that order was made
at a time when the court retained jurisdiction to act, the necessary documents
ordered by the court (i. e., findings and
conclusions) had not been signed or filed.
The court therefore did not "lose" jurisdiction to act on the motion; it never
gained jurisdiction.
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The points and authorities filed in sup~
port of the second motion, and the court's
subsequent order of August 4, 1967, purporting to rule on the motion, indicate that
this second motion was considered by the
court as a Hmotion to take additional testimany after the court had previously ruled
that the initial evidence had not justified
a finding that the road in question was
dedicated to the public." This indicates
that the court considered that the matter
was still before the court after submission
and before findings were filed, and considered that the matter was still subject to
motions to reopen although not to motions
for new trial. In my opinion the court had
lost jurisdiction at the end of the original
60 days.
For the reasons hereinabove expressed
I would reverse the 1%7 judgment appealed from.
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83 Cal.Rptr. 369
Trunnel PRICE, Petitioner,
Y.

The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO
COUNTY, Respondentj
The PEOPLE, Real Party In Interest.
L. A. 29680.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.

Jan. 30, 1970.
.Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1970.

Accused sought writs of prohibition
and mandamus to restrain the Superior
Court from using against him certain evidence obtained in execution of ,a search
warrant and to compel the court to order
disclosure of identity of a confidential informer. The Supreme Court, Peters, J.,
held that in view of informer's statement
that he had overheard a conversation be463 P.2d-46

tween persons known by him to have been
present at scene of crime in which it was
stated that accused had shot at police
vehicle at that time and place, there was a
possibility that informer himself was
present at scene of crime and thus was a
material witness on issue of guilt; hence
accused was entitled to have identity of
informer disclosed.
Writs granted.
Burke and McComb, JJ., dissented.
Mosk, J., dissented in part.

I. Criminal Law €=>394.4(6)
Searches and Seizures ~3.6(1)

Search affidavit reciting that a reliable
informant had told affiant that he jIhad
personal knowledge" that accused had in
his possession a rifle with a scope on it
two days before shooting, that informant
had stated that he had overheard a conversation between persons "known by him"
to have been present at scene of c:rime in
which it was stated that accused had shot
at police vehicle at that' time and place,
and that accused was within one block of
scene of shooting one-half hour after commission of crime was insufficient to justify
issuance of warrant, and evidence seized in
execution of warrant must be suppressed.
2. Witnesses $=3216

When it appears from evidence that
an informer is a material witness on issue
of accused's guilt, the People must either
disclose the informer's identity or incur
a, dismissal.
3. Witnesses ¢::3216

The defendant need not prove that
the informer would give testimony favorable to the defense in order to compel disclosure of his identity, nor need he prove
that the informer was a participant in or
even an eyewitness to the crime; the defendant's burden extends only to a showing that in view of the evidence, the informer would be a material witness on
issue of guilt and nondisclosure of his
identity would deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.

